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Voluntary Certification of 
Carbon Emission in Brazil - The 
Experience of an Electricity Trader
Fernando Amaral de Almeida Prado and Edvaldo Avila
Abstract
Few countries in the world have such availability of natural resources as Brazil. 
Even so, the country records increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions related to 
electricity, and this is due to political and economic factors. This chapter shows the 
experience of the largest Brazilian power trader in its pioneering effort to develop 
voluntary certifications (2011) in power buy and sell transactions, along with other 
energy efficiency actions. The initiative has accumulated 9 years’ experience with 
more than 1600 units in different industries, using a methodology aligned with the 
Paris Agreement. The chapter presents the calculation methodology and the safe-
guards that ensure information integrity and verification of the certified indicators. 
Only renewable sources are used in this methodology, such sources being qualified 
as incentivized by their sustainability characteristics being small-size power plants 
(less than 30 MW of capacity installed).
Keywords: greenhouse gases, voluntary certification, power trading, 
Paris Agreement Brazil
1. Introduction
The creation of a project for voluntary certification associated with the con-
sumption of electrical energy developed jointly by Sinerconsult Consultants and 
Comerc Energia, the largest power trading company in Brazil (Comerc manages 
a portfolio around 26,000 GWh/year), was motivated by the perception of the 
worsening emission conditions related to the Brazilian energy sector. Both organi-
zations were among the first to realize in Brazil that Kyoto Protocol Policies would 
lose force, and therefore, the natural alternative would be to adopt voluntary 
measures, as the Paris Agreement would later prove during Conference of Parts 
(COP 21).
Few countries in the world have such a strong renewable energy generation 
matrix as Brazil. Figure 1 shows that 73% of the installed capacity in Brazil comes 
from renewable sources [1]. In the past 5 years, however, power generation from 
thermal plants has been on the rise, despite the growing proportion of renewable 
energies. Figure 2 indicates this growth [2].
This can be traced back to a conceptual issue regarding environmental protec-
tion. Since the mid-1990s, all new hydroelectrical power plants have been conceived 
as run-of-river.
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Therefore, the operational capacity of the Brazilian hydroelectrical power 
plants, once fed by large rivers, no longer had pluriannual reservoirs. More and 
more, whenever hydrological conditions are adverse, the interconnected system 
needs to rely on thermal plants. Another point is that the growing insertion of wind 
farms, characterized by high intermittence, also leads to more frequent deploy-
ment of thermal plants. As a result, greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) have grown 
significantly, albeit still relatively low compared to countries with high thermal 
generation profiles. Alarmingly for Brazil, though, the emission levels measured in 
2014 are already higher than government projections for 2030 [3]. Figure 3 shows 
the growth trend for emissions [4].
Paradoxically, one of the countries with the broadest natural resources has 
shown deteriorating performance in emission indicators correlated with climate 
change.
As mentioned above, the perception of the increasing importance of voluntary 
actions and growing emissions attributable to the electrical energy industry have 
been the two key driving forces that led to the actions that will be detailed in the 
following sections. Nevertheless, from a wider perspective, the key issue is climate 
change, a serious concern for most countries.
Figure 1. 
Capacity power in Brazil in MW (July 2018) [1].
Figure 2. 
Production percentage from thermal power plants [2].
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Section 2 presents the analysis of voluntary markets and the need for clearly 
defined certification. Section 3 reviews the general context of the Paris Agreement 
and its pending issues regarding emission certification. Section 4 analyzes the 
general problem of calculating the greenhouse gas emissions in interconnected sys-
tems. Section 5 presents the factors that led Sinerconsult and Comerc to develop the 
certificates in the proposed form and the concepts utilized. Section 6 describes the 
calculation methodology. Section 7 reports the results achieved during the 9 years 
since the implementation of the certificate. Section 8 describes the evolution from 
certificate to energy efficiency actions, and Section 9 presents the final tentative 
ideas for the future and perspectives for voluntary certification in Brazil.
Several ideas related to this chapter was developed initially in an article “Clean 
Energy Certification in Brazil: A proposal,” published in the Journal of Sustainable 
Development of Energy, Water and Environmental Systems, by two of the authors1 
of this chapter [5].
2. Voluntary markets: Do they work?
Over the years, many companies have received incentives or mandatory rules in 
order to develop initiatives to reduce their GHG emissions.
A voluntary market is one that comes from a no mandatory initiative, decided by 
a country or by a corporation in order to make a sensitive contribution to one “cause.”
In this chapter, the focus is centered on an initiative that contributes to reduce 
GHG emissions and to help in the fight against climate change made by volunteered 
initiative of one of the biggest energy trader in Brazil.
Even the USA, a country that has not to date adhered to formal agreements and 
remains adamant in resisting international cooperation, has hundreds of voluntary 
initiatives of their own to reduce emissions. Here, we list some of the strategies 
that have been used: (i) regional legislation, (ii) sectorial policies, (iii) initiatives 
by industry associations, unions, and nongovernmental organization (NGOs), and 
(iv) business initiatives. Each one of the initiatives has its own motivation, and they 
may or may not be limited to their corresponding industry.
1The other two authors of original paper allowed the present authors to use the primary information.
Figure 3. 
Emission factors for the interconnected Brazilian system [4].
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Take for example, the carbon disclosure project (CDP) [6], which in 2017 
involved more than 6300 of the largest companies around the world to reveal 
progress in avoided emissions. Around 89% of them now have their own emission 
reduction target. Such initiatives can foster best practices around the world by 
helping people and companies think strategically about climate change. More than 
this, most of the companies also included their suppliers in their reduction targets. 
If met, the targets could be relevant contributions to the required GHG abatement 
to cap global warming at no more than +2°C. The CDP report disclosed reductions 
equivalent to 551 million tons of CO2 in 2017, with associated cost savings of US$ 14 
billion [6].
A review of the literature on voluntary markets [7–16] indicates that when 
information is available, the behavior of customers could be affected, also the 
demand for environmental friendly products. Companies with voluntary initiatives 
can benefit from them by gaining a positive image with final consumers.
Delmas and others [10] found that once energy is required to produce goods and 
services, consumers can drive change by choosing goods and services associated 
with renewable or “green” energy [10]; a good example of its importance is that 
renewable energy market in United States of America (USA) in the last 10 years 
(2007–2017) has grown up 5.4% yearly [16].
Delmas and others [9] found that a deregulated industry where competition is 
still incipient will be more affected by consumer perception and sensitivity to the 
issue, favoring the insertion of renewable sources, as can be better explained in fol-
lowing sections. The same perception can be reported by the authors of this chapter, 
in their experience in Brazil. Some of the clients of Comerc are very proud about 
their certificates. However, Delmas and others [9] note that sources of low cost such 
as coal can affect the decision process with the low price being the winner.
Kotchen, on the other hand [11], put on doubt if simple low-cost public policies 
can effectively promote stable voluntary initiatives, and whether such initiatives will 
continue to be effective, especially if more centralized policies are required in future.
Are voluntary and mandatory initiatives complementary or substitutes? In the 
opinion of authors, and likely in the opinion of anyone who reads the 2018 CDP 
Report [6], all parties, government and customers, must be involved in the effort. 
The figures cited by Hamilton [14] (volunteer markets could be US$ 100 million/
year) probably will be much more impressive with a successful Paris Agreement.
The initiatives give companies the tools they need to be prepared to lead the 
way in GHG regulation. “This market is growing fast, perhaps doubling each 
year.” Hamilton’s recommendation, however [14], centered in the needs of tools to 
measure the emissions targeted, an opinion that the authors share. This need comes 
from a pattern that will be required for compliance of the goals self-established.
There is no unanimity about the efficiency of volunteer markets; Ferguson, by 
instance [15], believes in many barriers, high costs, and complexity in reporting 
trustable results. Higher costs in voluntary markets result from the nonexistence of 
deterministic goals, as obvious. The agent can always decide not to invest in reduc-
ing its emissions, while others in doing so make its operation more costly. In regu-
lated industry, usually the regulator does not recognized costs that are not strictly 
related with regulation, so even an action that could be defensible may impact in 
economic results of a goodwill initiative.
Reporting results is always complex. There are several alternatives in the way to 
report the figures, per unit of production or through corporations and their subsid-
iaries, especially in different countries with different legislations. Some emissions 
come directly from the company and the others from the suppliers in chain produc-
tion. Due to avoiding double accounting, this kind of information must be carefully 
reported and checked.
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More than this, there are the difficulties related to the “leaks” that can occur 
along the chain production. Just to focus on the electricity industry, one can use the 
example of a wind power plant (carbon-free by definition) but that needs a high 
voltage line of interconnection, which demands some deforestation.
Kim and Lyon [12] share the pessimist view because only projects with low 
marginal costs are likely to succeed, as the regulatory risk is too high. Regulatory 
risks should be especially considered because if there are no rules, a subsequent 
emergence of these rules can make impossible to account for past initiatives. The 
hypothesis of the emergence of rules is not contradictory even in voluntary mar-
kets, since a country can voluntarily create its goals in international diplomacy, and 
to accomplish them, needs to encourage their fulfillment by incentive or even by 
mandatory regulation in some segments of the economy. A cap and trade environ-
ment could help the management of this kind of uncertainty.
Other beliefs from Hofmann [8] are connected with the junction of a public pol-
icy with some associated benefit, such as Brazilian incentives in transmission tariffs 
for small renewable generators, and volunteer markets. The authors would add to 
this, the goodwill or favorable image associated with environmental marketing.
3. Paris Agreement: understanding the main issues
Two decades after the creation of the United Nations Framework Climate 
Change Convention (UNFCCC), the parties (countries) remain firm in their 
decision to contribute to the reduction of GHGs, but the debate continues about 
how to share the burden among the parties, especially because of the substantively 
different development levels. The problem of coordinating actions has also been 
considered very important.
The previous experience with the Kyoto Protocol, where responsibility was 
distributed differently between developed and undeveloped countries, did not 
work. Countries such as the United States and Canada did not ratify the protocol in 
the belief that the effort and cost faced by developed countries would be wasted by 
developing countries, which had no deterministic emission reduction targets at the 
time [17].
The established targets and metrics were also questioned, so after the Kyoto 
Protocol expired, no new agreements with similar methodologies could be estab-
lished. An interesting example of such divergences may be the case of China: the 
country’s emission indicators are higher than those in the USA, yet are substantially 
smaller if considered on a per capita basis. A parallel reasoning can be applied to the 
analysis if we consider the useful life of emissions in the atmosphere: in a cumula-
tive calculation, Chinese emissions remain far below those produced over decades 
by developed countries.
This deadlock was bypassed in the Paris Agreement, which declares the sov-
ereignty of each country in choosing and setting possible goals within a process 
of goodwill. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement states that countries may cooperate 
internationally in different ways in order to reach climate goals and defines broad 
enough conditions, so that the targets set voluntarily by the parties, known as 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), can be achieved.
The UNFCCC targets established that the average world temperature not exceed 
2°C at least with a probability of 50%, so the goals for different countries, even 
defined in voluntary way, need to take in count a common objective.
There is a mood of relative optimism, or at least, it seems to be overcoming the 
pessimism that followed the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol; however, there are 
still many adjustments to be made.
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Among the most relevant points that could be mentioned is the need to cre-
ate metrics to compare the efforts expended by countries, since different ethical 
concepts can be raised, involving, for example, the “polluter pays” principles [18] 
(especially defended by Brazilian Diplomacy).
Other aspects include the principle of equity, in other words, the right each 
party has to guarantee its citizens can have access to the planet’s natural resources; 
the principle of capability, the capacity to produce actions that are feasible for the 
country, and finally, the principle of sovereignty, that involves the discussion of 
whether countries should have proportional targets or whether the sovereign right 
to decide according to their circumstances would apply. It should be noted that with 
regards to the “polluter pays” principle, it would be necessary for the carbon “price” 
to be evenly defined to avoid “polluter havens” [16].
Most of the points above are included in the COP 24 agenda—the summit will 
take place in Poland in 2018 to discuss accounting principles, legislation, proce-
dures, compliance with the targets defined by the NDCs themselves, as well as the 
rules to report reductions achieved through market mechanisms, including volun-
tary certifications.
4. Grid emissions: understanding the problem
Brazil has one of the largest interconnected systems in the world with similar 
dimensions to Western Europe (Figure 4); for large systems like this, it is very 
hard to quantify the amount of GHG emitted, especially with a combination of so 
many different sources with different environmental attributes like a coal-burning 
thermal plant or a carbon neutral small-scale wind turbine, for instance.
Figure 4. 
Brazilian interconnected grid [4].
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Being the Brazilian commercial model, a system of free competition, theoreti-
cally each plant at any point of the grid could inject the energy destined for a certain 
final consumer. It happens that even though the system is interconnected, the laws 
of physics determine that power and electric flows occur depending on the network 
topology, voltage levels, and the relative positioning between generation and load. 
Also, as interconnected grids are operated usually by independent entities and the 
criteria for dispatch is in regular bases, efficiency and supply security, it is virtually 
impossible to unequivocally associate load and generation.
This could be more complicated in Brazil, as sometimes hydro plants (the main 
source of power production in Brazil) may even be switched off to preserve water 
in the drier months, for future use. The resulting energy deficit is offset by energy 
produced by thermal plants burning a range of fossil fuels.
Therefore, there would be no one to one correspondence between generation and 
consumption, so the emission factor likely to be accounted for could be only that 
resulting from the average value to be determinate from some reasonable criterion.
However, there is a very important conditioner that brings a solution to this 
issue, the purchase and sale contracts. Thus, considering that, the energy produced 
cannot be stored (at least not in relevant quantities and at competitive costs) and 
assuming that the electricity consumed is equal to that produced (after technical 
and commercial losses), the match between generation and load is supported by 
the contracts. Therefore, the generating fact that connects a consumer to a low-
emission production (for example, small hydro power plant) can be made through 
the contract between the parties.
The methodology used by Comerc-Sinerconsult uses the set of rules established 
by the United Nations (UN) named “ACM-002-Methodology for Calculating 
the Average Grid Emission used for Clean Development Mechanism,” available 
on the UNFCCC website [19]. Even if considering that the Kyoto Protocol is no 
longer valid, the methodology, which was developed with sound principles, has 
criteria that remain valid. By the way, it is based on this methodology that the 
Brazilian Government through its Ministry of Science Technology Innovation 
and Communication (Brazilian Designated National Authority—DNA) publishes 
monthly the hourly statistics of the emissions of the electric grid. These statistics 
are published for both carbon credit projects, whose useful life still remains after 
the Kyoto Protocol and for corporate inventories [20].
The methodology discussed in this chapter is the one that is destined to invento-
ries which reflect the Brazilian emissions on time line. It is noteworthy that unlike 
other countries, the Brazilian emissions, which are naturally very low among coun-
tries around world, have been worsened due to the massive insertion of intermit-
tent renewable sources in the Brazilian electricity matrix (they need more thermo 
power plants in backup reserves) and by the growing difficulties of the hydrological 
regimes in the last 4 years.
Since 2009, Comerc using the methodology developed by itself and in partner-
ship with Sinerconsult served more than 1600 electricity consumers with power 
from incentivized sources in the deregulated market. This portfolio of clients has 
companies of more different industries in Brazil, like chemicals, vehicles, and auto 
parts, food, surgical and hospitals, electroelectronics, household cleaning products, 
packing, personal care, paper and cellulose, leverage, and so many others.
Brazil decides that hydro plants of any size, biomass thermal plants, solar farms, 
wind facilities, and some qualified cogeneration plants must be considered as 
carbon neutral. Although it is a known fact that some hydro plants do emit green-
house gases, the Brazilian DNA has determined that for accounting purposes in the 
Brazilian electric power sector, all hydro plants are to be considered as having no 
GHG emissions.
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5. Drives to voluntary certification: Comerc/Sinerconsult
In 2008, while the severity of the climate change became increasingly clear, no 
companies or customers in Brazil seemed aware of the issue, apparently believing 
that a country with plentiful natural resources has no reason for concern. At the 
time, they underestimated the fact that the strong presence of hydro power plants 
was built in the 1960s and 1970s, and could not be considered under the Kyoto 
Protocol and its eventual outcomes. Ironically, if electric power plants of any age 
could be considered, Brazil could expect that Amazon Forest will be listed as a 
contribution to efforts to combat climate change.
They also disregarded the fact that the new run-of-river hydroelectrical plants 
developed since the 1990s would increasingly require backup from thermal plants 
to ensure safety and to meet operational requirements during years of unfavorable 
rainfall. The same mistake was made when evaluating the intermittence of wind 
and solar power plants (solar plants still incipient at that time).
The idea of volunteer certification was inspired by the Conference of Parties 
(COP), which strived for consensual decisions—a daunting challenge given the 
diversity of political regimens and the cultural structures of each party. A tongue-
in-cheek remark—we all know how hard it is to reach consensus when allocating 
parking spaces in a condo homeowners’ meeting, so one can only wonder about the 
chances when discussions involve such disparate parties. Time showed that volun-
teering was the winning idea in COP 21.
In a pioneering initiative in Brazil, Comerc and Sinerconsult launched cer-
tificates for avoided emissions based on the consumption of renewable energy 
(incentivized energy as it is called in Brazil). Our priority at the time was to create a 
process that was easy enough to be understood by the players, while robust enough 
and equipped with safeguards to ensure ethics, reliability, transparency, traceabil-
ity, and coherence. All the information used is based on official data from energy 
contracts and their validation, as explained in the next section.
The measurement presented in the certificates, that is, tons of CO2 avoided, might 
not be easily understood among lay audiences, so an indicator of equivalent refores-
tation was added, making it easier for the general audience to understand the dimen-
sions of the avoided emissions by comparing it to a certain number of trees planted.
Obviously, reforestation figures could be very different numbers depending 
on tree types, harvest period, and spacing. For clarity, the certificate established a 
standard reforestation model, using calculations for avoided emissions approved for 
a project in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Brazil. This way, every 
calculation for equivalent number of trees follows the same conceptual basis, coher-
ent with the Unite Nation International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC).
Although this methodology was created many years before the Paris Agreement, 
the conceptual directives defined do not conflict with the new adopted principles. 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the GHG Protocol, one of the most important 
references in certifications around world, known to adopt conservative positions 
in the linkage of power plants and consuming units, adopted from 2017 a similar 
assumption as the Comerc-Sinerconsult model. The contract is the originating fact 
in establishing the environmental quality of the energy provided, to a consumer.
6. Methodology for modeling voluntary-certified avoided emission
By law, in Brazil, small power plants using renewable resources and with low 
environmental impact have a financial incentive in the form of discounted energy 
transport rates (TUSD—Distribution System Usage Tariffs, in the Portuguese 
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acronym). In other words, they pay a lower tariff for using the grid systems when 
the energy that was consumed is provided by an incentivized source.
The legislation establishes that the Regulatory Agency in Electricity Industry 
(ANEEL—National Electric Energy Agency, in the Portuguese acronym) must 
stipulate a tariff reduction of no less than 50% for transport of energy that comes 
from small hydro power plants, photovoltaic farms, wind power plants, and bio-
mass-fueled thermal plants (in special sugarcane bagasse), as well some qualified 
cogeneration, all of plants with capacity smaller than 30 MW.
It must be detached that the benefits are allowed also for final customers. The 
generation facilities pay 50% of transport tariff from their site until the gravity 
center of the electric system and the customers pay 50% from gravity center to its 
location. This is in line with the ideas of Hoffman [7] discussed in Section 2.
All eligible plants for these rebates are environmentally friendly and are consid-
ered carbon neutral. Consequently, identifying a plant that has discounts is similar 
to identifying a source of zero emissions. Here, it is possible to identify a two-way 
match. The problem remains as how to ensure that the energy actually comes from a 
set of incentivized power plants.
To solve this issue, the information provided by the Electric Energy Trading 
Chamber (CCEE, in Portuguese acronym) is fundamental. The CCEE is the orga-
nization responsible (officially) for the supervision and control of electric energy 
trades among distributors, traders, free consumers, and generators in Brazilian 
market. In short, CCEE is a clearing house for electricity contracts in Brazil.
Transactions based on incentivized energy are eligible for discounted transport 
tariffs, so the subsidize is allocated to tariffs of all other consumers that do not 
use renewable of small plants [5]. For this reason, it is very important the perfect 
identification of whom is eligible for the discounts, because the bigger they are, 
the more they impact other consumers. The regulator is quite worried about the 
fiscalization of subsides.
The Regulation Agency (ANEEL) established that CCEE is the entity responsible 
to assure that the energy traded with discounts comes from a source eligible by law 
for this kind on incentives. Since January 2009, the CCEE has consistently published 
an index known as the “discount matrix,” with the correlation between consumers 
and incentivized energy.
As related by de Almeida Prado et al. [5], the information provided from CCEE 
uses criterion of governance that gives confidence to stakeholders about the “qual-
ity” of energy used in each unit of consumption. The information could be checked 
by anyone to ensure about its reliability. All the figures are traceable and auditable 
and the rules are stable in time line. If a block of energy is tradable from an incen-
tivized source and deserves the discount, we can assure that this amount of energy 
comes from a GHG neutral source [5].
Thus, this methodology indirectly uses an official source to determine what 
percentage of the power consumed by a specific consumer actually comes from a 
GHG neutral source. One should remember that there is always the possibility that 
a given power plant will be unable to produce all of the energy sold. In such situa-
tions, the generator or trader must purchase energy from third parties to honor its 
agreements and provide the energy it sold but is unable to deliver. If this “replace-
ment” energy comes from other sources such as a nonincentivized, the consumer 
loses the right to the discount, in same proportion to the “not green” amount of 
energy supplied. The loss of this discount is made official by the CCEE and this 
procedure avoids that incorrect subsidizes could damage other stakeholders [5].
The proposed methodology uses an indirect but official inspection tool, which 
identifies the proportionality of the energy with incentives and therefore from sources 
that have zero emissions or are GHG neutral. This methodology determines how much 
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of the energy consumed is eligible for a transport discount and reduces the emissions 
published by the government for that particular month by a proportional amount.
The outcome is supported by the reliability of two official sources, one the 
amount of GHG emitted by the grid, and another by the exact volume of electricity 
consumed that was generated from renewable, GHG neutral sources. This reliability 
extends to the period during which the data are calculated, as both indicators are 
calculated for each calendar month, avoiding any distortions related to the period of 
calculation of these indicators.
The method used to calculate these numbers is described below. It is based on 
the trading chamber (CCEE) “ME001” (energy consumed) and “EI002” (TUSD 
incentive discount) reports.
First, the weekly consumption of energy reported in ME001 (energy consumed) 
reports is added up to come up with the total for the month. The amount of energy 
traded at a given percent discount is added and divided by the total volume, to 
arrive at:
  TD =  ∑ VE ∗ D _______
∑ VE
 (1)
where TD is the total discount, VE is the volume of energy, and D is the 
discount.
Consumption is then multiplied by the discount to arrive at the incentive that 
applies to the volume of energy:
  MIAE = ∑ WE ∗ TD  (2)
where MIAE is the monthly incentive applicable energy and WE is the weekly 
consumption.
The difference between monthly consumption and the amount of incentivized 
energy is then used to calculate the GHG emissions avoided each month, reported 
as tons of CO2 equivalents. This is calculated as a specific emission factor such as 
tons of CO2eq/MWh:
  AE =  (TMC − IAEC) ∗ EF (3)
where AE is the avoided emissions, TMC is the total monthly consumption, 
IAEC is the incentive applicable energy consumption, and EF is the emission factor.
The procedures described herein abide by the generally accepted principles 
for calculating inventory, which are relevance, universality, precision, transpar-
ency, and consistency. All of them are connected with the good practices presently 
discussed in Paris Agreement. Calculating avoided GHG emissions is a simple 
and reliable process if one has access to the customer reports issued by the CCEE 
regarding electricity consumption, specifically ME001 and EI002. Such reports are 
available only for customers, but of course they can, if necessary, give open access 
to anyone charged with checking the figures [5].
7. Results
The results obtained are substantial and represent a pioneering initiative in 
voluntary measures to reduce GHG emissions in Brazil. Table 1 presents the results 
of 900 different companies, with more than 1600 consumer units that have been 
using this methodology since 2009.
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8. Next steps
As discussed above, climate change is increasingly becoming a serious issue in 
light of the severe effects it might produce in human life. The pioneering Comerc-
Sinerconsult initiative is not the only option available today. There are other initia-
tives, for example, from the Brazilian Society for Wind Power (Abeeolica, in the 
Portuguese acronym), and from associations of sugar and alcohol producers, and 
even international entities, for example, GHG Protocol and the International REC 
Standard.
It is clear that ongoing regulatory follow-up must be part of all joint activities 
undertaken by certificate sponsors, who should be open to include enhancements 
and committed to the continuous improvement of the project.
Since 2017, Comerc developed similar concepts for the certification of energy 
efficiency. The emission factors in this case are obviously not the same as those 
utilized in corporate inventories neither the conserved energy is defined by the 
Chamber of Energy Commercialization (CCEE). However, the methodologies devel-
oped were maintained regarding ethics, reliability, transparency, and coherence. 
Comerc also maintained the equivalence with reforestation for a clearer presentation 
of figures to a nonexpert audience. The first certificates were already checked and 
will be expanded quickly as the energy efficiency actions are more valued in Brazil.
As the concepts from the Paris Agreement become consolidated, it will be pos-
sible to develop new activities with the “potential” commercialization of certificates 
and its utilization for the neutralization of events or transferences among com-
panies of the same group. Any such steps will be developed with the caution that 
characterized the creation of the certificates.
9. Conclusion
In the authors’ opinions, voluntary certification represents a path of no return 
for public projects and policies related to climate change.
The references presented in the Section 2 section indicate that consumers may 
exert pressure on the supply chain in different markets. This perception is aligned 
with Comerc experience in Commercial Relations and Marketing: more than 900 
corporations receive the emission certificates today.
Year Number of certificates Ton CO2eq Number of equivalent trees
2009 75 21,279.70 121,787.44
2010 75 76,900.86 440,117.14
2011 120 66,334.57 358,203.24
2012 192 111,248.36 778,738.53
2013 385 344,337.79 2,410,364.53
2014 474 528,496.53 3,699,475.71
2015 326 550,516.87 3,853,618.09
2016 996 473,668.40 3,315,678.82
2017 1130 701,854.64 4,912,982.48
Σ 3773 2,874,637.72 19,890,966
Table 1. 
Figures of Comerc Sinerconsult certificates (2009–2017).
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No one of these initiatives are easy to control, the visited literature indicates the 
need to take care of the metrics calculation, so that it is possible to offer reliability 
to the stakeholders in the use the data of these voluntary initiatives, for commercial 
planning, company records, environmental compliance reports, or commercial and 
marketing policy actions.
The methodology described by the authors brings in their control, mechanisms 
very robust and criteria that offer security and reliability in the figures obtained.
The methodology proposed by Comerc-Sinerconsult was the pioneer in Brazil for 
this type of action. Given the theme’s importance, innumerous other initiatives have 
arisen since the first certificates were emitted in 2009. It is important to note that the 
GHG Protocol, important reference that internationally had very strict criteria for the 
accounting of GHG emissions in interconnected grids began to use criteria similar to 
the Comerc-Sinerconsult since 2017. It demonstrates how important voluntary initia-
tives are, because they promote learning by the need to create and develop pioneering 
criteria and end up transforming the market in an evolutionary sense. The very trans-
formation of a set of mandatory rules originating in Kyoto seems to find more appro-
priate conditions for its success now with the voluntarism of the Paris Agreement.
This chapter presented the pioneering initiative led by Comerc and Sinerconsult, 
creating the first avoided emission certificates in Brazil. Since 2009, we have 
reported almost 3 million tons of equivalent CO2 that are no longer released into 
the atmosphere due to the commercialization of renewable energy from small-scale 
projects with low or no environmental impacts. This volume of emissions is equiva-
lent to a reforestation of approximately 20 million of trees and involved the partici-
pation of 900 companies with more than 1600 consumer units, all of them Comerc 
clients purchasing renewable energy or undertaking energy efficiency actions.
New perspectives are open now with the Paris Agreement that priories volunteer 
initiatives. The authors believe that in short time new markets of certification will 
result from similar initiatives. The path probably will be the commercialization 
of certificates and its utilization for the neutralization of events or transferences 
among companies of the same group. Any such steps must be developed with the 
caution that characterized the creation of the certificates here described.
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